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2Abstract: People care a great deal about their relative economic position and not solely
about their absolute economic position. However, behavioral evidence is rare.
This paper provides evidence on how the relative income position affects
professional sports performances. Our analysis suggests that if a player’s salary
is below the average and this difference increases, his performance worsens.
Moreover, the larger the income differences, the stronger positional concern
effects are observable. We also find that the more the players are integrated, the
more evident a relative income effect is. Finally, we find that positional effects
are stronger among high performing teams.
Keywords: Relative income, positional concerns, organizational justice, envy, social
comparison, relative derivation, equity theory, prospect theory, loss aversion, performance
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3“Throughout history, in all stages of cultural development, in most languages and as
members of widely differing societies, men recognized a fundamental problem of their
existence and have given it specific names: the feeling of envy and being envied” (Schoeck
1966: 3)
I. INTRODUCTION
Francis Bacon (1890) writes in his Essays of Councels, Civl and Moral that “Men of noble
birth are noted to be envious towards new men when they rise. For the distance is altered, and
it is like a deceit of the eye, that when others come on they think themselves go back” (p. 57).
Schoeck (1966) reports several events where people committed homicides due to the feeling
of envy: “In 1963, after a basketball game in New York City, a drab-looking day labourer
drove his car at the good-looking hero who had won the game and who was standing on the
pavement with his parents and friends. The murderer, who had no interest whatever in the
losing team, declared that he just could not stand seeing the glamour of that handsome
athlete” (p. 129).
Leading figures such as Adam Smith, Karl Marx, Thorstein Veblen or James
Duesenberry, have long expressed the importance of the relative position and social concerns.
Nevertheless, little attention is paid to the consequences of relative position. Accordingly,
Senik (2005), providing an overview of the literature, points out that “it is surprising that in
spite of the large theoretical literature on relative income and comparison effects […]
empirical validation of this conjecture is still scarce” (p. 47).
Research on happiness (for example, Easterlin 1974, 1995, 2001, Clark and Oswald
1996, Ng 1997, McBride 2001, Frey and Stutzer 2002a,b, Stutzer 2004, Layard 2003, Luttmer
2005, Ferrer-i-Carbonell 2005) has stressed and found strong empirical support for the
importance of the relative position. Also, laboratory experiments, using the ultimatum game,
4indicate that subjects are concerned with their relative position (Frank and Sunstein 2001,
Kirchsteiger 1994). Furthermore, as an alternative strategy, some researchers have used
hypothetical questions regarding choice between alternative states or outcomes, where the
choices allow for checking out relative positional concerns (Alpizar et al. 2005, Johansson-
Stenman et al. 2002, Solnick and Hemenway 1998, Tversky and Griffin 1993, Zeckhauser
1991). Nevertheless, many researchers are still skeptical of the importance of positional
concerns, because empirical evidence about its behavioral relevance remains scarce.
This paper links positional concerns to observable behavior in the field by looking at
an individual’s work performance. Relative income is certainly a major determinant of
people’s position. Thus, Frank and Sunstein (2001, p. 347) point out that “[…] positional
concerns typically loom larger with income than with the goods that regulation attempts to
provide (safety, leisure time, leave to take care of children and ailing relatives).” This paper
also contributes to the growing literature that investigates the link between pay and
performance. However, contrary to previous studies, we also investigate the relevance of the
relative income position. Lazear (2000) points out that theories related to the effects of
monetary incentives on work performances were untested due to the fact that appropriate data
were unavailable1.
A key compensation policy discussed in the literature is that of the promotion
tournament. Lazear and Rosen (1981) started to theoretically investigate the behavior of
players in response to the incentives created by a tournament2. The effect of positional
differences on performance is theoretically open. Some theories suggest that the resulting
frustration (of those with a low position) leads to resignation and poorer performance. Other
theories suggest that a larger positional difference induces individuals to try to achieve a
higher position, and hence raises performance. This paper argues that various factors
systematically influence which of the two effects is likely to prevail. The more individuals are
integrated into a particular social environment, the more differences in relative position lead
5to frustration and poorer performance. The individuals concerned may feel that they have
little possibility of changing their social position, so that they tend to resign themselves, thus
lowering their performance. In contrast, less well-integrated individuals are less burdened by
positional concerns, and a given income difference therefore has little or no effect on their
performance.
Empirical analysis of the behavioral impact of positional concerns is hindered by the
lack of useful income data. The opportunity of using sports data has led to a growing
empirical literature, testing existing theory with sports data3 (see Ehrenberg and Bognanno
1990a, 1990b, Becker and Huselid 1992, Orszag 1994, Lynch and Zax 1998, 2000, Fernie and
Metcalf 1999, Maloney and McCormick 2000, Melton and Zorn 2000, Sunde 2003). This
paper uses sports data to investigate the impact of soccer players’ relative income position on
their performances. The broad sample covers eight seasons of the German premier soccer
league (Bundesliga) between 1995/1996 and 2003/20044, and includes 1040 players, a salary
proxy and several performance variables. The empirical data has low variable errors.
Performance is clearly observable and is free of discrepancies, compared to frequently used
performance variables, such as GDP. Furthermore, soccer games are comparable to field
experiments, due to the fact that a match takes place in a controlled environment. All soccer
players are faced with the same rules and restrictions. Thus, when investigating the
connection between relative concern and performance, many factors can be controlled for.
The paper analyzes to what extent the relative income position of a player affects his sport
performance, holding the absolute income level constant. The relative income position is
proxied by the difference between teammates’ average salaries and players’ individual
salaries, as well as the difference between league players’ average salaries and players’
individual salaries. Thus, we investigate two different reference groups5. Moreover we look at
the effect of future or past salaries on current performance. The empirical results are robust6
and consistent with the general hypothesis that the relative position in terms of income
6differences in a team or in the league are, the worse is the performance of the individual
players are. These results are robust when controlling for player’s skill level or ability and the
involvement within a season (number of games and number of minutes played). Moreover,
we find that relative income effects are larger in teams with a higher level of pay inequality.
The econometric estimates are also consistent with the more specific hypothesis that social
integration strengthens this negative effect on performance and that positional effects
lowering performance are stronger among high performing teams. The investigation of
subgroups also contributes to the discussion of causality issues. If the mechanism were simply
that “better players earn more”, then we would expect to see the effect of positional concerns
in all sub-sample. However, the effect is primarily present for veterans and for top teams and
teams with a higher level of income inequality.
Section II provides a short overview of the relevant literature. Section III develops our
theoretical approach. Section IV presents the empirical results and Section V discusses
implications for business practice and offers concluding remarks.
II. POSITIONAL CONCERNS: AN OVERVIEW
Positional concerns due to relative judgments are common. People constantly compare
themselves with their environment and care greatly about their relative position, which
influences individual choices. Thus, not only is the absolute level of an individual’s situation
important (e.g., income), but also the relative position, and Frank (1999) emphasizes that
research provides “compelling evidence that concern about relative position is a deep-rooted
and ineradicable element in human nature” (p. 145).
7Marx (1849) stresses that we measure our wants and pleasures in relation to society.
Similarly, Galbraith (1958) points out that consumer demands are largely influenced by
society. Veblen (1899) emphasizes the importance of one’s relative position in society with
his concepts of conspicuous leisure and consumption. Contrary to standard utility theory,
Duesenberry’s (1949) utility concept is characterized by systematically interdependent
utilities. Thus, he explicitly incorporated relative preferences into consumer theory. Marshall
(1961), the creator of the modern demand theory, “recognized the power and prevalence of
the human desire for ‘distinction’” (p. 12).
Social sciences, such as sociology, social psychology, anthropology and economics
have placed considerable emphasis on the relevance of relative preferences as fundamental to
human motivation. The sociological theory of relative deprivation (Stouffer 1949) and the
psychological theory of social comparison (see Festinger 1954) show that comparisons with
others are an important phenomenon. Relative deprivation theory investigates interpersonal
and inter-group relations and comparisons. It stresses that a lower perception of one’s own
(group) status or one’s own welfare in relation to another person (group) can be the source of
hostility towards the other individuals or groups. A person may get frustrated when his/her
situation (e.g., individual earnings) falls relative to the reference group. The person feels
deprived. If improvement of the situation is slower than expected, the experience of
frustration can even lead to aggression (see, e.g., Walker et al. 1984). Several studies also
included the concept of interdependent preferences to allow for social comparisons, and have
also stressed the relevance of the relative position (e.g., Becker 1974, Easterlin 1974,
Scitovsky 1976, Schelling 1978, Pollak 1976, Boskin and Sheshinski 1978, Frank 1985, Ng
1987, Akerlof and Yellen 1990).
As mentioned in the introduction, happiness research has found strong evidence for
the importance of relative position. Some empirical studies found behavioral evidence for the
extent to which positional concerns matter. For example, Neumark and Postlewaite (1998)
8queried whether women’s decisions to seek paid employment depend on the employment or
incomes of other women. Thus, they investigated the question of whether relative income
comparisons could affect their employment decision. As a reference group, they focused on
women’s close relatives, but instead of making comparisons between sisters, they investigated
whether women’s employment is affected by the employment of their sisters-in-law, and
whether women’s employment is affected by the income of their husbands relative to the
income of their sisters’ husbands. Their results strongly support the relevance of positional
concerns.
III. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Empirical research on the link between pay and managerial performance has been hindered by
the lack of available data in the past (see Lazear 2000). Therefore, a number of researchers
use sports data – where performance can be relatively well measured – from disciplines like
golfing (see Ehrenberg and Bognanno 1990a, 1990b; Melton and Zorn 2000; Orszag 1994),
horse racing (Fernie and Metcalf 1999; Lynch and Zax 1998), tennis (Sunde 2003), car racing
(Becker and Huselid 1992) and running (Maloney and McCormick 2000) in order to test
existing theories in promotion tournaments.
The majority of empirical evidence using sports data supports the positive impact of
monetary incentives on sportive performance. Using golf data from the US Senior PGA Tour
in 1984, Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990a) found that the amount of prize money has a
positive influence on players’ performance. The observed effect occurs primarily in the later
rounds of a tournament, due to the marginal returns on efforts. Players with larger marginal
returns achieve better scores. Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990b) were able to confirm most of
these results, using European PGA Tour data from the year 1987. Only their previous finding,
9that exempt players are more responsive to financial incentives, was not clearly supported by
the European data.
Although Orszag (1994) found no statistically significant link between the amount of
total prize money and golfers’ performance using data from the US Senior PGA Tour of 1992,
further studies confirmed Ehrenberg’s and Bognanno’s (1990a, b) initial findings. For
instance, using 1994 and 1995 data, and trying to eliminate any possible survival biases,
Melton and Zorn (2000) found support for their theory that the amount of prize money in
Senior PGA tournaments affects players’ performance. Further empirical support for a
positive relationship between pay and performance results from research on tennis
tournaments and horse races. Sunde (2003) uses data from the final two rounds of the most
important tennis tournaments for professionals – from the men’s ATP tour. The results
indicate that the amount of prize money positively affects a player’s performance, if you
count the number of games won and the total number of games played.
Lynch and Zax (1998) examine the role that prizes play in Arabian horse races in the
US and Canada between 1991-1995 and find support for a positive relationship between the
prize spread and the absolute level of performance. Along the same lines, Fernie and Metcalf
(1999) investigate the relationship between pay and performance in an unbalanced panel of 50
individuals over eight years. They find that a hard working jockey receives higher extra pay.
Interestingly, the results also demonstrate that reputation lags behind performance or, in other
words, that it takes a certain time for good performance to be recognized.
Evidence from sports data supports the proposition that the overall level of
performance in a tournament is affected by the amount of prize money paid. Becker and
Huselid (1992) use the National Association for Stock Car Auto Racing (NASCAR) 1990
circuit and the International Motor Sports Association (IMSA) data for the years 1989 and
1990. They find that increased variation in the absolute spread between higher ranked and
lower ranked finishers has a statistically significant positive impact on participant
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performance, but at a diminishing rate. But little evidence has been found that the actual
tournament structure affects performance. Maloney and McCormick (2000) work with data
from 115 foot races held in the southeastern United States from 1987 to 1991. The results
indicate that higher prizes are associated with faster times for individuals already in the race
and that the higher prizes also attract a faster field. A higher concentration of the prize money
leads to higher effort levels. On the other hand, using road races on certified courses in the
United States and abroad in 1994, Lynch and Zax (2000) couldn’t find a robust impact of a
positive prize effect. After controlling for runners’ ability through individual fixed effects or
world-ranking points, the incentive effect mostly disappears (it remains only statistically
significant for the marathon). The results suggest that races with larger prizes lead to faster
times, due to the fact that they attract faster runners rather than encourage runners to run
faster.
Focusing on team sports, this study goes beyond investigating the performance impact
of absolute income by studying the performance impact of relative income. However, the
theoretical predictions are countervailing. It is therefore not possible to predict whether larger
income differences raise or lower individual performance.
An individual’s income is a key factor in comparisons. When people compare their
salaries, it is generally with people close to themselves (Layard 2003). Positional concerns are
extremely widespread in the workplace. Layard (2003) points out: “In organisations, calm can
often be maintained only by keeping peoples’ salaries secret” (p. 8). Elster (1991) reports that,
in China, model workers spend their bonus on a good meal for everybody to avoid harassment
by their colleagues. A manager keeps bonuses low because he fears the other workers and
because he wants to avoid the envy of other executive officers. Frank and Sunstein (2001)
report that surveys of employers and employees suggest that salaries depend on what
employees think other people are paid. Furthermore, the perception of the relative position
has a large effect on their morale.
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Festinger (1954) emphasizes that people do not generally compare themselves with the
rest of the world, but with a much more specific group, typically with others they see as being
similar to themselves or, in his words, “close to one’s own ability” (p. 121). Thus, soccer
players, like in other team sports, compare themselves with other soccer players, such as
teammates or league players in general, due to the same work profile. Similarly, soldiers in
World War II seem to have made comparisons primarily with members of their own military
group (Stouffer 1949). Thus, it seems reasonable to assume that a soccer player’s income
position, relative to other teammates’ and league players’ income position, has an impact on
his own behavior.
There are two countervailing theories about how income differences influence
performance. One stream of literature stresses the negative consequences of envy (see, e.g.,
Schoeck 1966). In this case, envy means negative inequity aversion (Grund and Sliwka 2005)
and can be characterized by feelings of inferiority, subjective injustice, and longing (Dunn
and Schweitzer 2004, Parrott and Smith 1993). An envious person may “prefer that others
have less, and he might even sacrifice a little of his own wealth to achieve that end”
(Zeckhauser 1991, p. 10), behavior that has been found in experiments (see, e.g., Kirchsteiger
1994). An envious person increases his utility by destroying some of the others’ assets, even
if such an action carries its own costs (cutting off one’s nose to spite one’s face). Thus a
negative sum interaction is started. The performance of those with lower income may
decrease due to frustration (“it could have or it should have been me”). They feel it
impossible to “keep up with the Joneses” – in the case of soccer, with the team superstars. As
a consequence, performance is lowered. It is even possible that players try to be resentful of
the players with a higher salary by, for example, not passing the ball so frequently to reduce
their performance.
Relative income effects may include negative aspects that go beyond envy per se.
Players dislike being in a lower income position, because the relative position may signal that
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they and their future prospects are lowly evaluated by others. Such perceptions and signals
harm their relationship with others, and affect their self-conception and performance.
A contrasting theory argues that large income differences lead to better performance,
as they raise the incentive to achieve a similar status. A positional arms race is provoked
through the process of rivalry (see Landers et al. 1996).
Our first hypothesis therefore leaves open whether positional income concerns in
general have a positive or a negative impact on individuals’ performance.
It seems a natural and interesting exercise to investigate to which extent not only the relative
income position within a team affects individual performance, but also which mechanisms
enforce positional concerns. The level of inequality within a team affects team’s climate.
Strong differences may reduce the climate quality within the team and provides the ground for
positional concern effects. Thus, we would expect that teams with a higher income inequality
are more vulnerable to such positional concerns.
The second hypothesis suggests that a larger income difference within a team enforces
positional concerns. Thus, positional concern effects are more visible in teams with a
stronger income inequality.
The effect of positional concerns is influenced by the pressure to conform. The established
members expect new members to adjust to the mores existing in their group or team. Failure
to conform is punished, mainly by social sanctions, but sometimes also in other ways
(Schoeck 1966). In the case of a soccer team, a newcomer has quite high transaction and
adaptation costs. He has to find his place in a team that consists of many players who already
know each other well. A player has to gain the acceptance of his colleagues in order to
become effective in the team.
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The third hypothesis suggests that newcomers in a team are less influenced by
positional concerns. Their performance is less, if at all, affected by the income
differences existing in the team.
High performing teams tend to be more vulnerable to positional concerns than low
performing teams. In an extraordinarily successful team, each team member tends to associate
superior performance with his or her individual performance rather than with other team
members. Differences in income negatively affect performance and are therefore less
acceptable, while frustration and performance deterioration can be explained using relative
deprivation theory. A relatively rapid average promotion rate for the group as a whole tends to
lead to frustration about individual promotion rates. The rapid promotion of colleagues in the
U.S. Air Corps during World War II inflated soldiers’ expectations and resulted in
disappointment (Stouffer 1949). In the sports industry, a winner-take-all market exists in
many situations. A small number of people get enormous amounts of money compared to
other athletes (see Rosen 1981, Frank and Cook 1995). Top teams often have several
superstars. For example, Table A1 in the Appendix indicates that five of the best paid soccer
players in Europe are playing for the same team (Real Madrid). Players in successful teams,
who are paid less than other teammates, may be frustrated, which negatively affects their
performance. Relative deprivation theory suggests that soccer players feel angry when they
lack something they desire, but which other teammates, such as superstars, have. Players feel
worse off when they have less fame and money than their teammates with similar attributes,
with whom they most frequently compare themselves. Moreover, superstars profit from the
success of their team outside of the soccer field. For example, David Beckham, best paid
soccer star in 2004 (see Appendix A1) signed a five year 50 million EURO contract with
Gillette in September 2004, in addition to multi-million EURO contracts with other
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companies, such as Adidas, Pepsi or Vodafone (see soccer-europe.com). His teammates may
well believe that they deserve similar rewards, according to their contribution to the success
of the team.
The fourth hypothesis suggests that positional effects lowering performance are
stronger among high performing teams.
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
1. Data
Empirical studies of the effects of income differences on managerial behavior have been
hindered by the lack of data on individual performance and the lack of publicly available
income data. In contrast, in certain sports, individual and team performance is well defined
and can be readily observed. This applies to professional soccer. As a side effect, the rising
commercialization of soccer led to better data sets. For example, in England, publicly listed
clubs must publish their annual reports (Kern and Süssmuth 2003). In some cases (as in the
case of the German Bundesliga), even salary data for individual players, or at least good
proxies thereof, are available.
This paper uses a unique data set of professional soccer players in the German premier
soccer league Bundesliga, which is one of the most important soccer leagues in the world7.
IMP, the official data provider of the Bundesliga and several broadcasting networks, provided
the data. This data includes soccer players’ individual performance (e.g. goals, assists, duels
won) and personal background data (e.g. age, nationality, position) over a period of eight
seasons between 1995/1996 and 2003/2004. We investigate an unbalanced panel of 1040
players covering more than 2000 observations. During the eight seasons, 28 different clubs
participated in the league due to annual promotion and relegation.
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Although the salaries of soccer professionals are not officially revealed by the
Bundesliga, there is substantial transparency. The most prominent soccer magazine in
Germany, the Kicker Sportmagazin, develops players’ market value estimates on an annual
basis. They provide a good proxy for actual salaries being paid by the clubs8. Before a new
season starts, the editorial staff develops an estimation of players’ market values. This data
has been collected in a consistent and systematic manner for several years by almost the same
editorial team, and is therefore likely to be consistent. To check the extent to which the
market value estimations used in our paper correctly reflect actual salaries, we investigate the
correlation between players’ effective reported salaries, as provided by another data source
called Transfermarkt.de, and our salary proxies. For example, it may be argued that salary
estimates are more precise for high-profile players and high-profile teams. This could lead to
measurement errors. The Transfermarkt.de data has the advantage of covering salary
information for high- and low-profile players, as well as high- and low-profile teams. The
correlation between these two data sources is high (r=0.754)9. Thus, measurement errors do
not seem to be a major problem. The empirical section will also indicate that the results
obtained are robust when dealing with outliers. Moreover, the proxies for salaries are even
more satisfactory when analyzing the relative position of soccer players, compared to their
teammates and their opponents. In addition, our data set includes individual transfer prices, as
well as earnings from ticket sales, merchandizing, and sponsoring revenues at the team level.
2. Empirical Model
In the quantitative analysis, four different models are investigated. Investigating the pay-for-
performance relationship requires a model that takes into account the incentive effects of
absolute and relative pay. Thus, our first model studies whether a player’s current
performance is affected by his future pay. The model assumes that player’s current
performance is not affect by the amount of money he has already been paid, but that the factor
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that should matter for current performance is future pay. As data on individuals’ perceptions
are not available we assume that the best available proxy for individuals’ perceptions is the
real future pay. The first model has the following baseline equation:
PERFit =  β0+β1 CTRLit+β2 ABSALi(t+1)+β3 RELSALi(t+1) +TEAMDi +TDt + _i + εit (1)
where PERFit is the performance of player i at time t. Several performance variables, such as
goals, assists, shots, ball contacts, duels and duels won are used. These dependent variables
refer to active involvement and success in the game. ABSALi(t+1)  is the future salary of a
player. To check for non-linearity, the squared value of the salary level is also considered.
RELSALi(t+1)  is the future relative salary of player i, measured by the difference between
teammates’ average salaries and players’ individual salaries10. The regression also contains
several control variables CTRLit such as AGE, AGE SQUARED, players’ position in the
game (ATTACK, MIDFIELD, DEFENSE) and team dummy variables (TEAMDi), as many
players change their position in the field and in their team over time. Team dummy variables
are included, as it can be argued that the results are driven by unobserved team characteristics
that are correlated with income and performance. Team fixed effects allow us to control for
such possible omitted variable bias. However, estimates without team effects are also reported
in order to go beyond a within team focus. Similarly, the estimates include a set of time
dummies (TDt) to control for possible differences in the players’ environment; _i is the
individual effect of player i, and εit denotes the error term.
A model using future pay assumes that a player is able to predict his and other players’
future income situation, and therefore his relative income position. However, experimental
studies suggest that individuals have difficulty in predicting their future utility and tastes (for
an overview, see, for example, Loewenstein et al. 2003). To avoid such criticism, we check
the robustness of the results, using past rather than future earnings as a reference point, as it
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can be argued that players’ performance is less likely to be affected by the amount of money
already paid out. On the other hand, we may still observe incentive effects, as we investigate
the relative income position of a player. Positional concerns due to the past income position
may affect current performance. Thus, our second baseline specification has the following
form:
PERFit =  β0+β1 CTRLit+β2 ABSALi(t-1)+β3 RELSALi(t-1) +TEAMDi +TDt + _i + εit (2)
where ABSALi(t-1)  is the player’s lagged absolute salary and RELSALi(t-1)  is the player’s
lagged relative salary.
The two previous models take into account that teammates serve as the reference
group. We also consider a player’s salary relative to the entire league, rather than the player’s
team. The pay of superstars and players in high profile teams might be even more salient to
players and the general public than the pay of members of one’s own team. Publicly available
data on incomes increase transparency and therefore provide players with information as to
what other league players get paid. Moreover, as the soccer player market is quite
homogenous in the sense of an equal job profile, players tend to compare themselves with
other players in other teams. The third and fourth baseline specifications take the following
form:
PERFit =  β0+β1 CTRLit+β2 ABSALi(t+1)+β3 RELSALLi(t+1) +TEAMDi + _i + εit (3)
and
PERFit =  β0+β1 CTRLit+β2 ABSALi(t-1)+β3 RELSALLi(t-1) +TEAMDi + _i + εit (4)
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where RELSALi(t+1) and RELSALi(t-1) are defined as the future or past relative salary position of
player i, measured as the difference between the leagues’ average salaries and the player’s
individual salary.
3. Pay and Performance: Basic Results
We first apply three different methodologies (pooling regression, random effect model and
fixed model) to all available performance measures. To identify which empirical method is
most suitable, we performed two statistical tests: the Lagrangian Multiplier (LM) test (see
Breusch and Pagan 1980) of the random effect model and the Hausman specification test
(Hausman 1978) in order to compare the fixed effect and the random effect models. The LM
test indicates that the null hypothesis of the individual effect _i being 0 is rejected in all cases
at the 1% significance level. Thus, the results suggest that the cohort effect is not zero, which
means that the pooling regression is not suitable. In all cases, the Hausman specification test
rejects the null hypothesis that the individual-level effects are adequately modeled by a
random effect model at the 1% significance level. Thus, individual effects are not
uncorrelated with the independent variables, which support the use of individual fixed effect
models. However, it should be noted that the results we obtain remain robust with all three
methodologies.
Table 1 presents the basic estimation results of our first model, using the entire set of
six dependent variables, representing various aspects of players’ performance: goals, assists,
shots, ball contacts, duels and duels won. In all regressions, we observe that all the
coefficients of RELSAL are negative. If a player’s salary is below the average and this
difference increases, his willingness to perform decreases and the negative effect of positional
concerns are more visible. At the same time, the positive impact of an above-average salary
change towards a stronger difference in relation to the teammates is also observable. The
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respective coefficients are highly statistically significant for all six dependent variables,
controlling for the absolute level of the salary. This finding is consistent with the first
hypothesis that the relative income level has an impact on performance, and the theories
proposing that a disadvantage in the relative income position worsen performance. The
coefficient of absolute income indicates a statistically significant positive impact on
individual performance, and the squared term, which is statistically significant with a negative
sign, indicates a non-linear relationship between salary and performance. Thus, an increase in
the salary beyond the turning point can lead to a harmful reduction in individual performance.
We also perform estimates without team fixed effects to counter the argument that the “within
team findings” indicate that teams get it more or less right, or that those who are paid worse
relative to their teammates also perform worse relative to their teammates. However, the
coefficient of the relative income variable remains highly statistically significant in all 6
estimates, excluding team fixed effects. We also test the joint hypothesis that the absolute and
the relative income as a group have a coefficient that differs from zero. The results in Table 1
indicate a clear rejection of this hypothesis, which supports the importance of the income
variables as a group. Looking at the control variables, we can also observe that age tends to
influence performances, such as duels and shots, having a concave performance profile – that
is, rising with age but decreasing as physical condition worsens.
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
In Table 2, we run the same 12 regressions, but instead of using future salary, we take past
salary. We also differentiate between estimates with and without team fixed effects. The
importance of the relative income position is supported in Table 2. All coefficients are
statistically significant. Moreover, based on an F-test for the joint significance of the relative
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and absolute income, it can be argued that, as a group, they significantly influence individual
performance. Table 2 also indicates that player characteristics are important.
The next step investigates the impact of positional concerns when changing the
reference group. We therefore look at a player’s salary relative to the entire league rather than
the player’s teammates. The first part of Table 3 provides the results of these 24 regressions.
For simplicity, only the income coefficients are reported. As can be seen, there is still a strong
relative income effect. Moreover, the joint significance of the relative and absolute income
variable suggests that these two variables together play a significant role in the determination
of performance.
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
4. Robustness Tests
This subsection presents several robustness tests. First, we include as a control variable the
number of games played per season11. As can be seen in Table 3, the results remain robust.
We also obtain similar findings when controlling of the minutes played per season. It is highly
relevant to control theses robustness tests, otherwise one could criticize that players with
relatively low salaries are less skilled and get less time on the field, and hence perform worse.
In a next step we use as dependent variables the number of goals, assists, shots, ball contacts,
duels and duels won per game as the dependent variable. The results also remain robust. We
control for ability since player fixed effects pick up any omitted variables (player
characteristics) that do not change over time. Using eight seasons one can argue that over
such a period, ability has a fixed and a variable portion. For example, a player’s ability grows
initially peaks and then declines prior to retirement, but throughout this cycle the player’s
ability stays above a player-specific threshold. How can we control for the portion that
changes over time? To a certain extend such an effect is controlled with the variable age. In
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addition, one can cluster the standard errors by player since clustering will pick up any player-
specific characteristics that change over time. Thus, we also perform pooled estimations with
team and time dummy variables, using the number of minutes played as weight unit to take
into account unobservable players’ specific characteristics, with standard error adjusted for
the clustering on individuals. Also in these estimates, the previous results remain robust. In a
next step, we investigate whether the results react sensitively to outliers. Therefore, we also
run specifications that resist the pull of outliers, using iteratively reweighted least squares
with Huber and biweight functions tuned for 95% “Gaussian efficiency” (see Hamilton 2004,
pp. 239-240). As a consequence, more extreme outliers are less heavily weighted in the
regression calculations, or even dropped altogether in very extreme cases. We present
estimations using all four models. The results of the 24 regressions are presented in the
second part of Table A3. The previous findings remain robust. In all 24 cases, the coefficient
of the relative income variable is statistically significant at the 1 percent level, with a negative
sign. There is also support for a positive non-linear relationship between absolute income and
performance. Moreover, in line with previous results, we observe that, as a group, the relative
and absolute income variables are jointly significant in all estimates.
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
What happens when a team hires some new superstar players? Lucifora and Simmons (2003)
define superstar players that reach more than 0.40 goals per game. We extend this definition
including also those players that reach more than 0.40 assists per game as superstars. A new
superstar may have a strong impact on the team. First, the relative pay in a team falls when it
hires some new superstar players and may influence the performance of other players. Thus,
we investigate whether the relative income effects remain robust after controlling for new
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stars in a team. The previously obtained results remain robust, showing that RELSAL is
highly statistically significant with a negative sign.
Existing studies on the relative income position normally calculate how far apart a
person’s situation is from the respective reference group. As a further robustness test, the
ratio of teammates’ income to players’ own income is used as proxy for the relative income
position (the higher the value, the stronger the disadvantage in the relative income position).
This calculation may be relevant in the following situation: A player has an average annual
income of $100’000 in a soccer team, where his teammates earn on average $200’000 per
year. The team management decides to double the salaries of all the team members. In the
new constellation, the player now receives $200’000, while his teammates get $400’000 on
average. The ratio remains constant (value 2), but the difference has changed from $100’000
to $200’000. The regression results support the previous findings.
Furthermore, instead of pooling the different years together, each year is investigated
in a cross-sectional analysis. In this case the coefficient RELSAL can be interpreted the
following way: the more my salary is below the average, the worse is my performance and at
the same time, the more my salary is above the average, the better is my performance,
controlling for the absolute income. Likewise in these cases, relative income effects are
observable and therefore results obtained previously are supported. Finally, we also take a
closer look at possible team effects. Previously, possible effects were controlled for using, in
the majority of cases, team fixed effects. The regression can be extended, using proxies for
teammates’ strength. Player performance varies in different settings, as co-workers offer
different levels of assistance (Idson and Kahane, 2000, Torgler 2006). Team composition has
a strong impact on team productivity (Hamilton, Nickerson and Owan 2003).
Complementarities in production, and gains from specialization in the form of accumulated
task-specific human capital, are valuable to other team members (see Lazear 1998). Three
aspects are included: teammates’ age, exchanges and sending-offs in a game per season.
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Teammates’ impact on a player i is measured by calculating the average values for the
teammates (excluding the values for player i). More exchanges may be correlated with higher
individual performance, because of an increase in the teammates’ average physical strength.
Similarly, higher exchange values may also be an indicator of good second line players. On
the other hand, expulsions have a strong negative impact on the probability of winning a
game, because losing a teammate reduces the team’s strength (for empirical evidence, see
Torgler 2004). Specifically, the team structure must be reorganized, which, because soccer
skills are highly specialized, tends to reduce players’ and team-mates’ comparative advantage.
The results indicate that the coefficients of the relative income variable remain statistically
highly significant. Moreover, the joint hypothesis that none of the salary variables (absolute
and relative income position) has a coefficient that differs from zero can clearly be rejected.
The results also indicate that teammates are important. Based on an F-test for joint
significance, teammate factors play a significant role in the determination of individual
performances. Particularly strong effects are observed for the variable exchanges (positive)
and sending-offs (negative). The impact of teammates’ age (negative) is less robust and not
always statistically significant.
5. Income Inequality, Newcomers and Top Teams
In this subsection we are going to separate teams with a higher income inequality from those
with a lower income inequality and also top teams from others. Moreover, we are going to
separate new players from veterans. This section allows evaluating not only our discussed
hypotheses, but also contributes to the issue of causality, which will be discussed in the next
section. If the mechanism is simply that better players earn more then we would predict that
the effect of the relative income position is visible in all sub-sample, However, we will see
that this is not case.
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Table 4 provides the first results summarizing 72 estimates, differentiating between
teams with a higher income inequality and teams with a lower one. In order to split the
sample, the mean team GINI coefficient over the investigated period was calculated. The
teams ranked above average were placed in one group labeled “higher income inequality”,
and the remaining teams were placed in the other group. The results suggest that players in
teams with a higher income inequality are indeed more vulnerable to the consequences of
income differences than players in less successful teams. Thus, hypothesis 2 cannot be
rejected.
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]
Table 5 presents the findings of the estimates, referring to the behavioral consequences
of positional concerns of newcomers in a team compared to players already integrated into the
team (for at least one season). The sample of players is split between newcomers and
integrated players. Due to many team changes in our data set, this issue can be empirically
investigated. All four models are taken into consideration. The first part focuses on models
with teammates as a reference group, using future and past incomes. The second part uses
league players as a reference group. The regressions clearly show the tendency that, in line
with hypothesis 3, newcomers are less driven by positional concerns. In only a few
regressions is the relative income coefficient statistically significant for newcomers. In
contrast, in the sub-sample of integrated players, the coefficients are mostly statistically
significant, with a negative sign. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that integrated
players resent differences in income more intensely than newcomers, diminishing their
performance accordingly if they are below the teammates’ average salary. The question
remains whether changing teams is correlated with ability or, in other words, whether stayers
are worse off compared to movers, as they may not have received very tempting offers from
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other teams. Thus, it is checked whether transferring to another team is correlated with ability.
The proxy for ability is taken to be a selection for the national team or the performance in the
past season before changing teams. The results suggest that changing teams is not correlated
with ability.
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]
Table 6 finally reports the results referring to hypothesis 4, proposing that high
performing teams experience stronger relative income concerns than low performing teams.
In order to split the sample, the mean team performance over the investigated period (the rank
at the end of each season) was calculated. The teams ranked above average were placed in one
group labeled “top team”, and the remaining teams were placed in the other group. The results
suggest that players in top teams are indeed more vulnerable to the negative (and also
positive) consequences of income differences than players in less successful teams. Table 6
summarizes the results of 72 regressions. In most of the cases, the respective coefficient is
statistically significant, with a negative sign, so that the performance of the players declines if
disadvantage in the relative income position increases. On the other hand, players’
performance in teams with lower performance levels is less affected by their relative income
position. The question arises as to whether salaries are a better predictor of actual ability in
better teams. Results for future earnings are also presented.
[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE]
6. Causality
In general, the direction of the link between income and performance is unclear and has rarely
been investigated in detail in the literature. It may be argued that lower-paid players might
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perform worse because they are not such good athletes; which means that poor performance
results in lower pay, not the other way around. However, as mentioned previously, if the
process was simply that better players earn more, then you would not expect to see our
previous findings that report that the relative income effect is not anymore visible in certain
sub-samples.
1. Overview
In the first part of this subsection we are going to summarize previous findings that have tried
to investigate carefully the relationship between pay and performance (mainly at the team
level). The main problem is, as Hall et al. (2002) point out, that such a link “plays a central
role in the theory of team sports but is seldom investigated empirically” (p. 149). In general,
looking at the empirical research available today, most soccer studies investigate players’
income or teams’ income as the dependent variable and search for factors that affect it
(Eschweiler and Vieth 2004, Garcia-del-Barrio and Pujol 2004, Huebl and Swieter 2002,
Lehmann and Weigand 1999, Lucifora and Simmons 2003, Lehmann and Schulze 2005). For
the German soccer league, Eschweiler and Vieth (2004), Huebl and Swieter (2002), Lehmann
and Schulze (2005), as well as Lehmann and Weigand (1999), confirm a positive pay-
performance relationship. Only a couple of studies take team performance as the dependent
variable (see Forrest and Simmons 2002, Szymanski and Kuypers 1999). Investigating
whether club expenditures have a positive impact on the team’s success within the English
soccer league, Szymanski and Kuypers (1999) find a significant correlation between a team’s
pay and a team’s performance. Using data from Italian, English, and German soccer leagues,
Forrest and Simmons (2002) find a strong team pay-performance relationship for the leagues
in Italy and England. On the other hand, only a marginally significant wage-performance
relationship has been found for the German Bundesliga. However, as mentioned by Hall et al.
(2002), the causality has seldom been investigated. Do teams really get what they pay for?
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Some studies focusing on baseball doubt whether this is the case, suggesting that payrolls are
not useful in explaining the won-lost records in baseball (Quirk and Fort 1999, Zimbalist
1992). On the other hand, Hall et al. (2002) show with their data that, while there is no
evidence that causality runs from pay to performance over the period 1980 to 2000, the cross-
section correlation between pay and performance increased significantly in the 1990s. They
also found support for the relationship running from payroll to performance, and not vice
versa, when investigating the relationship between a team’s pay and a team’s performance for
English soccer data using the Granger causality test. Such differences can be explained by
institutional differences affecting causality between different sports or sport periods. In
English soccer, players are hired on relatively short-term contracts, ranging from one to five
years, and players’ trading and mobility are key parts of the league. The mobility costs are
also lower, due to the relative geographic proximity to each other. Moreover, young stars at
the beginning of their career are more mobile, which is comparable to the stars of the league,
where trade clauses are “virtually unheard of in English soccer” and “leading teams regularly
trade their top stars in search of a better lineup, whereas players frequently express their
ambition to play for a variety of clubs in a variety of leagues during their career” (p. 158).
These factors are also visible in the German Bundesliga. Our data indicates that the number of
active seasons in the league per player varies between one and eight, with an average of 2.7
seasons per player. A change of team has been observed in 12.7% of the cases. Similarly,
Carmichael, Forrest and Simmons (1999) report that, in the English league, 12.3% of the
players changed teams in the seasons 1993-1994. Moreover, Dobson and Goddard (1998),
using a data set covering 77 football leagues between 1946 and 1994, find evidence of reverse
causality; specifically, that the influence of lagged revenue on current performance is greater
than the influence of lagged performance on current revenue. Davies et al. (1995), who focus
on professional rugby league matches between 1964 and 1993, use attendance rather than
revenues, but find similar results for the direction of causality. 
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2. 2SLS and Granger Causality Test
The previous subsection does not provide us a lot of empirical support that causality runs
from team performance to team salary. On the contrary, there is the tendency that pays affects
performance rather than the other way round. However, currently only a limited number of
studies are available to get a robust picture of such a relationship. Our first attempt was to use
experts’ salary estimates of future or past income to deal with causality. Furthermore, experts’
evaluations attempt to measure the market salary of a player rather than the contract salary,
which might remain constant for more than one year. In a next we have built sub-samples
finding strong differences, which indicates that the argument  “better players earn more” is
too simplistic. In a next step, we continue to deal with this important issue, performing a
Hausman specification test, running several 2SLS estimations and providing Granger
causality tests.
In Table 7, we report 2SLS estimations together with several diagnostic tests and the first
stage regression results. Table 7 indicates that for the 2SLS, the coefficient of the variable
RELSAL remains statistically significant with negative sign. Moreover, coefficients for
RELSAL are not smaller compared to the previous table, suggesting little reverse causation
between current performance and past or future salary. If reverse causation biased the
coefficient for the relative income variable upward in previous tables, the coefficient
estimated using 2SLS should be smaller12.  First we perform a Hausman specification test, to
whether there is sufficient difference between the coefficients of the instrumental variables
regression and those of the standard regression (see Hausman 1978). The Prob>chi2 statistics
indicate that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the standard regression is a consistent
estimator for our equation, which supports the argument that there is no endogeneity problem
with our estimates.
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To check the robustness, we use two different instruments for RELSAL. Teams’ income
inequality structure might be a good starting point to identify a valid and strong instrument.
We have seen previously that teams with a higher income inequality are more affected by
relative income effects. The question is whether income inequality also affects player
performance directly. Controlling for income inequality in the estimations leads to the results
that income inequality does not affect performance directly. The coefficient was not
statistically. On the other hand, our previous results indicate that income inequality enforces
the relative income effect. Thus, we use the GINI coefficient as an instrument for the relative
income position. As a second instrument we include nationality or in other words whether a
player is a foreigner or not as an instrument for the relative income position. Foreign players
may be subject to more pressure to conform than domestic players which affects the strength
of relative income effect. As an instrument for the absolute income we take the number of
spectators at home in the past season. A higher level of spectators in the last season is
connected with higher revenue in the past, which should affect players’ current salary.
Table 7 presents a selection of 2SLS estimations that we conducted. The relative income
effect is still visible. The coefficient RELSAL is statistically significant in all regression at the
1 percent level. Similarly, also the F-test for joint significance of the relative and absolute
income position is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The results show that the
instruments are effective in explaining the relative and absolute salary. All factors are
statistically significant at the 1% level. Moreover, the F-tests for the instrument exclusion set
in the first-stage regression are also statistically significant in all cases at the 1% level. In
addition, Table 7 reports a test for instrument relevance using the Anderson canonical
correlations LR for whether the equation is identified. The test shows that the null hypothesis
can be rejected, indicating that the model is identified and the instruments are relevant (see
Hall, Rudebusch and Wilcox 1996). The Anderson-Rubin test suggests that the endogenous
variables are in most of the cases jointly statistically significant. Such a test is robust to the
30
presence of weak instruments. The partial R2 is checked to take into account that there is
more than one endogenous variable (Shea 1997). The Shea’s partial R-squared is a test of the
individual explanatory power, accounting for correlation among the instruments. These results
are not reported in Table 7, but the findings (closeness of the Shea’s R-squares) indicate that
there is enough separate variation in the instruments.
[TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE]
The next step performs a Granger-causality test to investigate the link between pay
and performance (see Granger 1967). The notion of Granger causality suggests that, if lagged
values of players’ income helps predict current performance values in a forecast (formed from
lagged income and lagged performance values), then income Granger causes performance. On
the other hand, if the same lagged values help to predict current income, we argue that
performance Granger causes players’ pay (similar arguments apply for the future income
model). A unidirectional causality from one to the other must be identified. To perform the
Granger causality test, symmetric regression tests for the future and past income model are
applied. They include the six performance variables and the relative and absolute income
position independently. Table 8 presents the results of 12 Granger causality tests using the
future income model. The results show that non-causality between income and performance
can be rejected.  At the same time, it fails to fully reject consistently the non-causality
between performance and income (relative or absolute). Thus, the test results indicate a
rejection of the hypothesis that income does not Granger cause performance but not a full
rejection of the hypothesis that performance does not Granger cause income. Thus, there is a
tendency that income seems to cause performance in stronger manner than performance cause
income. However, results obtained with the past income model are less obvious.
[TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE]
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V. CONCLUSIONS
The empirical results presented suggest that not only the absolute, but also the relative income
position, has an impact on individuals’ performance. If a player’s salary is below the average
and this difference increases, his willingness to perform decreases and the negative effect of
positional concerns are more visible. At the same time, the positive impact of an above-
average salary change towards a stronger advantage in relation to the teammates is also
observable. The cross-sectional analysis also shows that the more the salary is below the
average, the worse is the performance and the more a player’s salary is above the average, the
better is his performance. We also investigate what factors lead to a stronger relative income
effects. We find that such effects are stronger among teams with a higher level of income
inequality. Furthermore, more integrated members of a team react more negatively than
newcomers, resulting in diminished performance. Moreover, players in top teams also react
more negatively than players in other teams.
To what extent can these findings on soccer players’ behavior be transferred to
business practice? What can managers learn from them? First of all, the results are relevant
for the design of incentive mechanisms. Positional concerns are important in areas where
measurable performance is directly linked to salary (pay-for-performance). For instance, in
many sales organizations, it is common practice that sales commissions make up a large part
of the total salary. Thus, insurance agents or financial advisors are paid according to key sales
performance indicators, such as net new money, return on assets, and the number of products
or policies sold within a certain period. In order to stimulate internal competition among the
sales force, and to push individual performance, transparency is increased by comparative
performance rankings among the sales force. Given that performance directly translates into
personal income, such rankings run the risk of diminishing, rather than improving,
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performance among those below the average. The most successful sellers, who dominate the
rankings and earn much more than their colleagues, may well weaken the performance of the
entire sales team if their performance is not able to compensate the loss generated by those
salesmen that lower their performance. Moreover, it is important to take into account that a
higher level of inequality enforces position concern effects.
Pay-for-performance schemes are usually linked to output measures neglecting
process- or context-specific factors. Accordingly, sales people at the lower end of the ranking
may see that higher ranked colleagues are not performing better, but simply benefit from
lucky punches or advantageous context factors (e.g., the districts they cover have a higher
number of potential clients). Although pay-for-performance schemes are helpful to identify
low performers, they may tend to lower the average performance of the team. A positional
arms race may be provoked through the process of rivalry (Landers et al. 1996), but our
results don’t support such a tendency. This downside risk is even bigger for top performing
teams, just as individuals playing in top soccer teams are more vulnerable to the negative
consequences of a relative income disadvantage. Top performing sales teams may already
have ambitious and self-motivated team members so that further stimulation of internal team
competition leads to negative motivational effects. Thus, management is faced with the
difficult task of finding the right amount of ‘healthy competition’ within a team. It is a
challenge of calibrating the wage offers in such a manner to generate the most favorable effect
possible on the effort of other workers, as well as to extract the appropriate effort from the
worker to whom they are directed.
Pay-for-performance schemes address extrinsic motivation, and leave intrinsic
motivation aside. According to Frey and Osterloh (2005), such schemes tend to reinforce
selfish extrinsic motivation, crowding out intrinsic motivation. Managers need to consider the
motivational aspects of the transparency of relative income positions in terms of
corresponding benefits and downside risks. Negative effects of output-oriented financial
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incentives, such as pay-for-performance schemes, should be complemented with process-
oriented non-financial incentives, such as awards for the best team player, best rookie, or
most innovative team member of the year. This takes into account the individual’s need for
social distinction, using a non-material extrinsic reward (see Frey 2005). The empirical results
are also relevant for the treatment of new employees joining an established team. The findings
suggest that newcomers are less driven by positional concerns than existing team members.
Newcomers’ performance is less affected by a disadvantage in the relative position.
Conformism, adaptation, adjustment and short-time satisfaction due to the change (which is
often connected with an absolute salary improvement) may account for these differences. In
business practice, managers often switch jobs in order to increase their salary (e.g., in
investment banking). Employees joining a new firm are therefore less affected by a
disadvantage in their relative income position. However, over time, newcomers get used to
their new situation and start comparing their performance/income relation with the new
reference group. Management needs to take into consideration that, after an initial adaptation
period, newcomers base their income expectations on their relative position in the team. As a
result, a perceived disadvantage in the performance/income relationship tends to lead to
behavioral changes.
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Table 1: The Effect of Positional Concerns within the Team on Performance (Future Earnings)
       
Dep. V.: Goals Dep. V.: Assists Dep. V.: Shots Dep. V.: Ball Contacts Dep. V.: Duels Dep. V.: Duels Won
 
FE FE FE FE FE FE
Independent Variables
SALARY       
RELSAL(t+1) -0.377*** -0.256*** -0.232*** -0.128 -3.943*** -3.093*** -64.999*** -32.780 -42.514*** -24.140*** -19.459*** -9.670***
 (-6.00) (-2.70) (-3.98) (-1.45) (-9.37) (-4.94) (-4.31) (-1.50) (-9.19) (-3.48) (-8.38) (-2.78)
ABSAL(t+1) 0.663*** 0.776*** 0.641*** 0.740 3.450*** 4.276*** 109.682*** 134.766*** 45.353*** 62.414*** 23.364*** 32.393***
 (7.24) (6.92) (7.54) (7.10) (5.63) (5.75) (5.08) (5.30) (6.73) (7.60) (6.91) (7.85)
SQ ABSAL(t+1) -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.028*** -0.028 -0.220*** -0.219*** -6.316*** -6.043*** -3.234*** -3.187*** -1.570*** -1.544***
 (-4.68) (-4.59) (-7.05) (-6.94) (-7.63) (-7.65) (-6.93) (-6.62) (-10.20) (-10.06) (-9.86) (-9.69)
PLAYER’S
CHARACTER
AGE -0.201 -0.167 0.028 0.112 5.801** 6.272*** 113.429 140.402 62.155** 68.440*** 34.717*** 37.626***
 (-0.58) (-0.48) (0.09) (0.35) (2.52) (2.72) (1.22) (1.50) (2.45) (2.68) (2.73) (2.94)
AGE SQ 0.005 0.005 -0.001 -0.002 -0.092*** -0.094*** -2.135 -2.753* -1.012*** -1.106*** -0.604*** -0.651
 (1.07) (0.99) (-0.14) (-0.37) (-2.70) (-2.74) (-1.32) (-1.68) (-2.70) (-2.91) (-3.21) (-3.41)
POSITION Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
TEAM No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
SEASON Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
PLAYER Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-Test joint significance 151.62*** 101.37*** 81.49*** 82.63*** 151.23*** 122.27*** 61.79*** 49.60*** 168.73*** 133.67*** 154.95*** 124.34***
 (REL. & ABOLUTE INC.)a
R-Squared 0.280 0.296 0.178 0.196 0.289 0.318 0.177 0.274 0.297 0.269 0.291
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Groups (Players) 768 768 768 768 768 768 562 562 768 768 768 768
Number of Observations 2143 2143 2143 2143 2143 2143 1387 1387 2143 2143 2143 2143
Notes: *,** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. t-statistics in parentheses.a Without including SQ ABSOLUTE VALUE.
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Table 2: The Effect of Positional Concerns within the Team on Performance (Past Earnings)
      
Dep. V.: Goals Dep. V.: Assists Dep. V.: Shots Dep. V.: Ball Contacts Dep. V.: Duels Dep. V.: Duels Won
 
FE FE FE FE FE FE
Independent
Variables
SALARY       
RELSAL(t-1) -0.366*** -0.326*** -0.344*** -0.397*** -4.628*** -3.753*** -116.115*** -73.858*** -55.079*** -36.166*** -26.652*** -17.768***
 (-5.64) (-2.99) (-5.89) (-4.03) (-10.87) (-5.26) (-7.57) (-2.85) (-11.42) (-4.47) (-11.00) (-4.37)
ABSAL(t-1) -0.174** -0.112 -0.196** -0.247** -2.288*** -1.330* -61.219*** -19.929 -21.779*** -2.432 -9.810*** -0.877
 (-2.03) (-0.92) (-2.54) (-2.25) (-4.07) (-1.67) (-3.07) (-0.71) (-3.42) (-0.27) (-3.07) (-0.19)
SQ ABSAL(t-1) -0.010** -0.011** -0.006 -0.005 -0.059** -0.062** -1.634* -1.592* -1.248*** -1.276*** -0.645*** -0.653***
 (-2.19) (-2.46) (-1.40) (-1.35) (-2.05) (-2.16) (-1.89) (-1.83) (-3.82) (-3.91) (-3.93) (-3.98)
PLAYER’S
CHARACTER
AGE 1.298*** 1.283*** 1.167*** 1.154*** 12.256*** 12.318*** 369.180*** 380.978*** 122.728*** 124.833*** 60.019*** 61.427***
 (4.01) (3.93) (4.01) (3.92) (5.77) (5.78) (4.54) (4.68) (5.10) (5.17) (4.97) (5.07)
AGE SQ -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.215*** -0.218*** -6.942*** -7.370*** -2.074*** -2.162*** -1.066*** -1.116***
 (-5.52) (-5.44) (-5.53) (-5.37) (-7.44) (-7.45) (-5.21) (-5.49) (-6.32) (-6.52) (-6.47) (-6.70)
POSITION Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
TEAM No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
SEASON Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
PLAYER Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-Test joint
significance
17.09*** 7.81*** 17.93*** 9.65*** 62.87*** 23.79*** 31.34*** 8.75*** 72.89*** 26.67*** 68.76*** 26.17***
(REL. &
ABOLUTE
INC.)a
R-Squared 0.080 0.098 0.070 0.083 0.188 0.21 0.112 0.142 0.169 0.193 0.168 0.19
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
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Groups
(Players)
1040 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040 774 774 1040 1040 1040 1040
Number of
Observations
2833 2833 2833 2833 2833 2833 1869 1869 2833 2833 2833 2833
Notes: *,** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. t-statistics in parentheses. a Without including SQ ABSOLUTE VALUE.
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Table 3: League Players as the Reference Group and Robustness Analysis
REFERENCE GROUP: AVERAGE INCOME OF ALL THE LEAGUE PLAYERS (PER SEASON)
Dep.Variable Model: FE Future Income RELSAL (t+1) ABSAL (t+1) SQ. ABSAL (t+1)
Player Time Team Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value F-test
Goals Yes No No -1.017*** -6.19 -0.044 -0.26 -0.019*** -4.41 106.89***
Goals Yes No Yes -0.996*** -6.03 -0.013 -0.08 -0.018*** -4.32 109.98***
Assists Yes No No -0.661*** -4.37 0.188 1.21 -0.028*** -7.10 91.46***
Assists Yes No Yes -0.685*** -4.48 0.176 1.12 -0.028*** -7.03 94.40***
Shots Yes No No -5.872*** -5.23 1.562 1.36 -0.235*** -8.02 127.45***
Shots Yes No Yes -5.983*** -5.42 1.572 1.38 -0.231*** -8.13 139.73***
Ball Contacts Yes No No -50.682 -1.51 124.069*** 3.57 -6.474*** -7.14 59.18***
Ball Contacts Yes No Yes -67.648** -2.01 104.260*** 2.98 -6.260*** -6.97 57.76***
Duels Yes No No -45.693*** -3.69 41.084*** 3.24 -3.294*** -10.18 138.64***
Duels Yes No Yes -49.607*** -4.07 38.432*** 3.06 -3.234*** -10.29 151.34***
Duels Won Yes No No -22.629*** -3.66 20.142*** 3.17 -1.608*** -9.94 134.89***
Duels Won Yes No Yes -24.835*** -4.06 18.484*** 2.94 -1.578*** -10.00 145.65***
Dep. Variable Model: FE Past Income RELSAL (t-1) ABSAL (t-1) SQ. ABSAL (t-1)
Goals Yes No Yes -0.649*** -2.81 -0.343 -1.46 -0.014*** -3.21 13.16***
Goals Yes No No -0.571** -2.47 -0.341 -1.45 -0.012*** -2.72 8.32***
Assists Yes No Yes -0.534** -2.56 -0.311 -1.46 -0.008** -2.05 9.17***
Assists Yes No No -0.507** -2.44 -0.329 -1.55 -0.008* -1.92 6.83**
Shots Yes No Yes -4.961*** -3.24 -1.796 -1.15 -0.089*** -3.08 28.22***
Shots Yes No No -4.075*** -2.60 -1.711 -1.07 -0.074** -2.51 15.93***
Ball Contacts Yes No Yes -43.906 -0.96 27.772 0.60 -2.208** -2.54 11.43***
Ball Contacts Yes No No -34.197 -0.74 23.522 0.50 -1.897** -2.16 7.36***
Duels Yes No Yes -26.987 -1.56 14.613 0.83 -1.591*** -4.88 33.85***
Duels Yes No No -16.124 -0.91 15.670 0.86 -1.408*** -4.19 18.99***
Duels Won Yes No Yes -12.298 -1.42 8.806 1.00 -0.822*** -5.01 34.33***
Duels Won Yes No No -7.196 -0.81 9.304 1.02 -0.738*** -4.38 20.30***
Models controlling for games played per season
Dep. Variable Model: FE Future Income RELSAL (t+1) ABSAL (t+1) SQ. ABSAL (t+1)
Goals Yes No Yes -0.894*** -5.65 -0.225 -1.40 -0.007 -1.61 51.95***
Assists Yes No Yes -0.538*** -3.78 -0.043 -0.30 -0.014*** -3.83 32.91***
Shots Yes No Yes -3.829*** -4.39 -0.538 -0.61 -0.075*** -3.31 39.45***
Ball Contacts Yes No Yes -22.058 -1.20 10.856 0.58 -1.336*** -2.69 6.32***
Duels Yes No Yes -18.904*** -3.04 5.832 0.93 -0.907*** -5.61 40.33***
Duels Won Yes No Yes -9.032*** -2.80 2.604 0.80 -0.415*** -4.95 33.26***
Dep. Variable Model: FE Past Income RELSAL (t-1) ABSAL (t-1) SQ. ABSAL (t-1)
Goals Yes No Yes -0.378* -1.83 -0.369* -1.76 -0.003 -0.76 1.68
Assists Yes No Yes -0.279 -1.53 -0.336* -1.81 0.002 0.66 1.86
Shots Yes No Yes -2.345** -2.12 -2.050* -1.82 0.017 0.81 2.44*
Ball Contacts Yes No Yes 16.254 0.71 10.427 0.45 0.478 1.09 0.46
Duels Yes No Yes 6.732 0.83 11.305 1.38 -0.205 -1.32 2.18
Duels Won Yes No Yes 4.648 1.1 7.144* 1.67 -0.126 -1.56 2.69*
Models controlling for games played per season REFERENCE GROUP: TEAMMATES
Dep. Variable Model: FE Future Income RELSAL (t+1) ABSAL (t+1) SQ. ABSAL (t+1)
Goals Yes Yes Yes -0.181** -2.04 0.521*** 4.88 -0.008* -1.83 47.49***
Assists Yes Yes Yes -0.045 -0.56 0.456*** 4.74 -0.014*** -3.82 29.79***
Shots Yes Yes Yes -2.200*** -4.53 1.225** 2.10 -0.073*** -3.20 43.43***
Ball Contacts Yes Yes Yes 0.013 0.00 31.176** 2.27 -1.202** -2.41 5.56***
Duels Yes Yes Yes -10.643*** -3.07 16.302*** 3.91 -0.971*** -5.99 47.36***
Duels Won Yes Yes Yes -2.971 -1.65 9.507*** 4.38 -0.443*** -5.25 36.33***
Dep. Variable Model: FE Past Income RELSAL (t-1) ABSAL (t-1) SQ. ABSAL (t-1)
Goals Yes Yes Yes -0.158 -1.61 -0.131 -1.19 -0.004 -0.99 1.31
Assists Yes Yes Yes -0.234*** -2.68 -0.265*** -2.73 0.001 0.38 4.06**
Shots Yes Yes Yes -2.059*** -3.91 -1.518** -2.59 0.008 0.35 8.13***
Ball Contacts Yes Yes Yes -32.697** -2.50 -34.967** -2.46 0.323 0.74 3.36**
Duels Yes Yes Yes -11.280*** -2.93 -5.191 -1.21 -0.248 -1.59 6.23***
Duels Won Yes Yes Yes -5.390*** -2.69 -2.250 -1.01 -0.142* -1.75 5.60***
Notes: All other variables included. F-test: Joint significance of the two variables RELATIVE INCOME and ABSOLUTE
INCOME, *,** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
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Table 4: Income Inequality and Positional Concern
FE Coefficient t-value FE Coefficient t-value
TEAMMATES
SALARY (t-1) Modela
Lower Income Inequality Higher Inc. Inequality
Dep. Variables Dep. Variables
Goals -0.366 -1.39 Goals -0.239* -1.73
Assists -0.212 -0.92 Assists -0.440*** -3.41
Shots -2.606 -1.49 Shots -3.602*** -4.13
Ball Contacts -116.845* -1.86 Ball Contacts -71.158** -2.30
Duels -39.989* -1.84 Duels -30.399*** -3.29
Duels Won -21.667** -2.02 Duels Won -15.160*** -3.22
SALARY (t+1) Modela
Lower Income Inequality Higher Inc. Inequality
Dep. Variables Dep. Variables
Goals -0.307 -1.24 Goals -0.230* -1.92
Assists -0.237 -1.02 Assists -0.146 -1.31
Shots -4.452*** -2.68 Shots -3.023*** -3.96
Ball Contacts -30.097 -0.51 Ball Contacts -39.889** -2.01
Duels -31.226 -1.56 Duels -24.965*** -3.03
Duels Won -13.404 -1.33 Duels Won -10.195** -2.45
SALARY (t-1) Modelb
Lower Income Inequality Higher Inc. Inequality
Dep. Variables Dep. Variables
Goals -0.530** -2.23 Goals -0.309*** -3.20
Assists -0.346* -1.69 Assists -0.438*** -4.89
Shots -3.962** -2.53 Shots -4.261*** -6.98
Ball Contacts -155.871*** -2.79 Ball Contacts -120.842*** -5.48
Duels -61.843*** -3.16 Duels -47.310*** -7.31
Duels Won -32.250*** -3.33 Duels Won -22.421*** -6.81
SALARY (t+1) Modelb
Lower Income Inequality Higher Inc. Inequality
Dep. Variables Dep. Variables
Goals -0.316 -1.40 Goals -0.310*** -3.43
Assists -0.129 -0.61 Assists -0.285*** -3.40
Shots -3.384** -2.23 Shots -3.591*** -6.15
Ball Contacts 19.566 0.38 Ball Contacts -73.905*** -3.51
Duels -26.410 -1.45 Duels -40.519*** -6.48
Duels Won -11.064 -1.21 Duels Won -18.061*** -5.72
LEAGUE PLAYERS
SALARY (t-1) Modelc
Lower Income Inequality Higher Inc. Inequality
Dep. Variables Dep. Variables
Goals 0.013 0.04 Goals -0.674** -2.24
Assists -0.302 -0.96 Assists -0.452 -1.60
Shots -1.797 -0.75 Shots -4.701*** -2.46
Ball Contacts -5.858 -0.08 Ball Contacts -18.058 0.76
Duels 2.854 0.10 Duels -25.247 -1.24
Duels Won 1.398 0.09 Duels Won -11.273 0.28
SALARY (t+1) Modelc
Lower Income Inequality Higher Inc. Inequality
Dep. Variables Dep. Variables
Goals -0.652** -2.36 Goals -1.212*** -5.56
Assists -0.448* -1.73 Assists -0.845*** -4.19
Shots -0.846 -0.45 Shots -7.548*** -5.42
Ball Contacts -45.216 -0.79 Ball Contacts -80.726* -1.85
Duels -8.772 -0.39 Duels -54.332*** -3.62
Duels Won -7.229 -0.64 Duels Won -25.578*** -3.39
Notes: All other factors controlled for. Robust standard errors. *,** and *** denote statistical
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. a  Reference group teammates, player, team and time
fixed effects. b Reference group teammates, player and time fixed effects. c Reference group league
players, player and team fixed effects.
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Table 5: Newcomers and Positional Concerns
FE Coefficient t-value FE Coefficient t-value
TEAMMATES
SALARY (t-1) Modela
Not Changed Teams Changed Teams
Dep. Variables Dep. Variables
Goals -0.361*** -3.01 Goals -1.191 -1.60
Assists -0.357*** -3.21 Assists -1.125 -1.65
Shots -3.212*** -4.15 Shots -8.741 -1.57
Ball Contacts -63.125** -2.20 Ball Contacts -280.877 -1.34
Duels -28.105*** -3.18 Duels -51.586 -0.85
Duels Won -13.536*** -3.03 Duels Won -26.033 -0.92
SALARY (t+1) Modela
Not Changed Teams Changed Teams
Dep. Variables Dep. Variables
Goals -0.204* -1.96 Goals -1.491** -2.31
Assists -0.095 -0.98 Assists -0.737 -1.16
Shots -2.672*** -3.99 Shots -10.491* -1.99
Ball Contacts -25.523 -1.08 Ball Contacts -14.125 -0.05
Duels -23.292*** -3.13 Duels -54.299 -0.92
Duels Won -9.042** -2.41 Duels Won -17.175 -0.62
SALARY (t-1) Modelb
Not Changed Teams Changed Teams
Dep. Variables Dep. Variables
Goals -0.406*** -3.77 Goals -0.755 -1.12
Assists -0.379*** -3.81 Assists -1.110* -1.84
Shots -3.472*** -4.99 Shots -8.632* -1.76
Ball Contacts -57.953** -2.33 Ball Contacts -359.850** -2.08
Duels -28.147*** -3.54 Duels -68.301 -1.28
Duels Won -13.465*** -3.35 Duels Won -33.770 -1.36
SALARY (t+1) Modelb
Not Changed Teams Changed Teams
Dep. Variables Dep. Variables
Goals -0.397*** -4.39 Goals -1.098* -2.00
Assists -0.222*** -2.64 Assists -0.721 -1.33
Shots -3.360*** -5.83 Shots -8.493* -1.96
Ball Contacts -43.793** -2.22 Ball Contacts 41.141 0.18
Duels -28.123*** -4.37 Duels -40.691 -0.85
Duels Won -12.080*** -3.72 Duels Won -13.716 -0.61
LEAGUE PLAYERS
SALARY (t-1) Modelc
Not Changed Teams Changed Teams
Dep. Variables Dep. Variables
Goals -0.606** -2.48 Goals 1.988 1.17
Assists -0.460** -2.03 Assists -2.103 -1.37
Shots -4.320*** -2.73 Shots -1.510 -0.12
Ball Contacts -24.440 -0.49 Ball Contacts -82.542 -0.23
Duels -19.254 -1.07 Duels -73.472 -0.54
Duels Won -7.524 -0.82 Duels Won -37.963 -0.60
SALARY (t+1) Model
Not Changed Teams Changed Teams
Dep. Variables Dep. Variables
Goals -1.006*** -5.53 Goals -0.298 -0.24
Assists -0.643*** -3.80 Assists -1.106 -0.92
Shots -5.606*** -4.79 Shots 0.926 0.09
Ball Contacts -76.927** -2.07 Ball Contacts 367.631 1.17
Duels -45.470*** -3.49 Duels 83.814 0.79
Duels Won -22.373*** -3.41 Duels Won 43.037 0.86
Notes: All other factors controlled for. Robust standard errors. *,** and *** denote
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. a  Reference group teammates,
player, team and time fixed effects. b Reference group teammates, player and team fixed
effects. c Reference group league players, player and team fixed effects.
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Table 6: Top Teams and Positional Concern
FE Coefficient t-value FE Coefficient t-value
TEAMMATES
SALARY (t-1) Modela
Top Team Not a Top Team
Dep. Variables Dep. Variables
Goals -0.271* -1.87 Goals -0.17 -0.79
Assists -0.500*** -3.80 Assists -0.011 -0.05
Shots -3.333*** -3.58 Shots -3.193** -2.14
Ball Contacts -77.032** -2.46 Ball Contacts -52.403 -0.99
Duels -34.781*** -3.56 Duels -16.739 -0.87
Duels Won -17.487*** -3.52 Duels Won -8.448 -0.89
SALARY (t+1) Modela
Top Team Not a Top Team
Dep. Variables Dep. Variables
Goals -0.193* -1.66 Goals 0.003 0.01
Assists -0.105 -0.96 Assists 0.031 0.13
Shots -34.695 -1.42 Shots -28.561 -0.47
Ball Contacts -2.561*** -3.39 Ball Contacts -5.530*** -3.19
Duels -19.676** -2.39 Duels -38.396* -1.84
Duels Won -7.605* -1.83 Duels Won -19.577* -1.88
SALARY (t-1) Modelb
Top Team Not a Top Team
Dep. Variables Dep. Variables
Goals -0.312*** -3.15 Goals -0.296 -1.52
Assists -0.370*** -4.12 Assists -0.044 -0.24
Shots -3.871*** -6.07 Shots -3.867*** -2.88
Ball Contacts -123.603*** -5.77 Ball Contacts -102.930** -2.05
Duels -48.842*** -7.30 Duels -35.811** -2.07
Duels Won -23.674*** -6.98 Duels Won -18.225** -2.12
SALARY (t+1) Modelb
Top Team Not a Top Team
Dep. Variables Dep. Variables
Goals -0.313*** -3.64 Goals 0.119 0.52
Assists -0.238*** -2.95 Assists 0.111 0.50
Shots -3.518*** -6.25 Shots -4.135*** -2.62
Ball Contacts -74.053*** -3.80 Ball Contacts -32.206 -0.58
Duels -39.823*** -6.54 Duels -32.660* -1.71
Duels Won -17.879*** -5.81 Duels Won -16.932* -1.77
LEAGUE PLAYERS
SALARY (t-1) Modelc
Top Team Not a Top Team
Dep. Variables Dep. Variables
Goals -0.597* -1.95 Goals -0.157 -0.46
Assists -0.376 -1.35 Assists -0.441 -1.35
Shots -4.572** -2.31 Shots -2.402 -1.02
Ball Contacts -23.100 -0.41 Ball Contacts -2.125 -0.03
Duels -20.755 -1.00 Duels -8.229 -0.27
Duels Won -8.051 -0.76 Duels Won -5.859 -0.39
SALARY  (t+1) Modelc
Top Team Not a Top Team
Dep. Variables Dep. Variables
Goals -0.642** -2.23 Goals -1.202*** -5.78
Assists -0.195 -0.70 Assists -0.869*** -4.44
Shots -0.306 -0.16 Shots -7.346*** -5.44
Ball Contacts 9.027 0.15 Ball Contacts -96.764** -2.37
Duels 9.378 0.40 Duels -57.624*** -3.92
Duels Won 1.203 0.10 Duels Won -27.073*** -3.64
Notes: All other factors controlled for. Robust standard errors. *,** and *** denote
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. a  Reference group teammates, player,
team and time fixed effects. b Reference group teammates, player and time fixed effects. c
Reference group league players, player and team fixed effects.   
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Table 7: 2SLS Estimations
2SLSa Salary  
First Stage Regressions
 (relative and absolute income)
 
Test of excluded
instruments:
  
 
Relative income Joint signif. Relative income:
gini coeff. (t)
Absolute
income: home
spectators (t)
relative
income
absolute
income
Anderson canon.
corr. likel. ratio
Anderson-Rubin
test
TEAMMATES      
MODEL: INC. (t+1)      
Goals -0.703*** 10.65*** 2.213*** 8.78E-07*** 17.96*** 19.94*** 20.857*** 4.24**
Assists -0.538*** 8.10** 2.213*** 8.78E-07*** 17.96*** 19.94*** 20.857*** 3.69**
Shots -6.048*** 19.69*** 2.213*** 8.78E-07*** 17.96*** 19.94*** 20.857*** 8.30***
Ball Contacts -131.684*** 7.74** 3.026*** 4.03E-07*** 13.41*** 27.65*** 24.663*** 3.62**
Duels -69.165*** 20.35*** 2.213*** 8.78E-07*** 17.96*** 19.94*** 20.857*** 8.97***
Duels Won -31.493*** 16.44*** 2.213*** 8.78E-07*** 17.96*** 19.94*** 20.857*** 7.28***
2SLSb Salary  
First Stage Regressions
(relative and absolute income)
 
Test of excluded
instruments:
  
 Relative income Joint signif. Relative income:
foreigner
Absolute
income: home
spectators (t-2)
relative
income
absolute
income
Anderson canon.
corr. likel. ratio
Anderson-Rubin
test
TEAMMATES
MODEL: INC. (t-1)
Goals -0.994*** 8.20** -0.444*** 2.96E-06*** 12.74*** 43.58*** 22.924*** 3.63**
Assists -0.598* 3.99 -0.444*** 2.96E-06*** 12.74*** 43.58*** 22.924*** 1.71
Shots -6.916*** 8.33** -0.444*** 2.96E-06*** 12.74*** 43.58*** 22.924*** 3.23**
Ball Contacts -215.242** 15.02*** -0.496*** 2.17E-06*** 11.09*** 18.30*** 21.507*** 7.14***
Duels -124.682*** 21.54*** -0.444*** 2.96E-06*** 12.74*** 43.58*** 22.924*** 13.19***
Duels Won -60.260*** 22.49*** -0.444*** 2.96E-06*** 12.74*** 43.58*** 22.924*** 13.90***
Notes: All other variables included. a Individual fixed effects. b Team fixed effects. Joint signif.: Joint significance of the two variables RELATIVE INCOME and
ABSOLUTE INCOME. *,** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
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Table 8: Granger Causality Test
Granger Causality SALARY (t+1) Model
 RELSAL ABSAL
 Beta t-value Beta t-value
Did the Performance Come First?   
H0: Performance does not Granger cause
the position concerns/salary
  
Dependent Variable: Income   
Independent Variables   
Lagged Goals -0.061* -1.74 0.056* 1.71
Lagged Income 0.641*** 14.06 0.692*** 16.88
Did the Positional Concerns or Salary
Come First?
  
H0: Positional concerns or salary do not
Granger cause the performance
   
Dependent Variable: Goals  
Independent Variables  
Lagged Goals 0.540*** 15.68 0.559*** 16.43
Lagged Income -0.131*** -5.19 0.099*** 4.14
Dependent Variable: Relative or Absolute
Income Position
  
Independent Variables   
Lagged Assists -0.022 -0.85 0.028 1.13
Lagged Income 0.664*** 15.92 0.708*** 18.35
Dependent Variable: Assists   
Independent Variables   
Lagged Assists 0.327*** 12.89 0.336*** 13.07
Lagged Income -0.249*** -9.13 0.224*** 8.46
Dependent Variable: Income   
Independent Variables   
Lagged Shots -0.076** -2.20 0.075** 2.42
Lagged Income 0.634*** 13.54 0.683*** 16.34
Dependent Variable: Shots   
Independent Variables   
Lagged Shots 0.487*** 17.67 0.531*** 20.15
Lagged Income -0.249*** -9.19 0.178*** 7.58
Dependent Variable: Income   
Independent Variables   
Lagged Ball Contacts 0.006 0.23 -0.007 -0.28
Lagged Income 0.671*** 15.02 0.714*** 16.36
Dependent Variable: Ball Contacts   
Lagged Ball Contacts 0.289*** 11.42 0.280*** 10.53
Lagged Income -0.280*** -11.04 0.240*** 9.57
Dependent Variable: Income   
Independent Variables   
Lagged Duels -0.044 -1.59 0.030 1.22
Lagged Income 0.653*** 15.08 0.707*** 17.98
Dependent Variable: Duels   
Independent Variables   
Lagged Duels 0.318*** 13.50 0.362*** 15.86
Lagged Income -0.275*** -11.58 0.198*** 9.53
Dependent Variable: Income   
Independent Variables   
Lagged Duels Won -0.044* -1.70 0.037 1.56
Lagged Income 0.655*** 15.70 0.705*** 18.29
Dependent Variable: Duels Won   
Independent Variables   
Lagged Duels Won 0.391*** 17.81 0.418*** 19.35
Lagged Income -0.217*** -10.34 0.165*** 8.30
Notes: Robust standard errors. *,** and *** denote statistical significance at the
10%, 5% and 1% level.
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APPENDIX
Table A1
Football’s Richest Players (March 2004)
Player Club € Millions Per Year
Beckham Real Madrid 22.2
Zidane Real Madrid 14.05
Nakata Bologna 11.8
Ronaldo Real Madrid 11.09
Raul Real Madrid 11.09
Vieri Inter 10.35
Owen Liverpool 9.6
Keane Manchester United 8.87
Figo Real Madrid 8.87
Del Piero Juventus 7.4
Source: www.soccer-europe.com
Table A2
Summary Statistics
 Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Goals 2.026 3.239 0.00 28.00
Assists 2.002 2.576 0.00 19.00
Shots 21.881 23.128 0.00 148.00
Ball Contacts 747.388 573.759 0.00 2464.00
Duels 158.540 118.390 0.00 639.00
Duels Won 317.008 230.543 0.00 1236.00
RELSAL(t-1) -0.056 2.118 -20.13 7.63
ABSAL(t-1) 2.855 2.541 0.05 25.00
RELSAL(t+1) -0.035 2.434 -19.73 7.48
ABSAL(t+1) 3.390 2.748 0.20 25.00
AGE 26.557 4.154 17.00 40.00
GAMES PLAYED 18.333 10.055 1.00 34.00
MINUTES PLAYED 1299.562 898.462 1.00 3060.00
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Table A3
Outlier Analysis
REFERENCE GROUP: AVERAGE INCOME OF ALL THE LEAGUE PLAYERS (PER SEASON)
Player Time Team Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value F-test
Dep. Variable Model: Outlier Analysis
Future Income
REL. INCOME (t+1) ABS. INCOME (t+1) SQ. ABS. INC. (t+1)
Goals Yes No Yes -0.530*** -8.15 0.162** 2.40 -0.530*** -8.15 180.34***
Assists Yes No Yes -0.479*** -6.93 0.217*** 3.03 -0.479*** -6.93 158.98***
Shots Yes No Yes -6.972*** -11.85 1.664*** 2.72 -0.302*** -12.93 347.46***
Ball Contacts Yes No Yes -83.224*** -2.75 208.468*** 6.74 -13.310*** -18.94 356.15***
Duels Yes No Yes -60.191*** -8.97 42.712*** 6.12 -4.186*** -15.68 361.31***
Duels Won Yes No Yes -31.626*** -9.08 20.159*** 5.57 -2.068*** -14.94 341.42***
Dep. Variable Model: Outlier Analysis
Past Income
REL. INCOME (t-1) ABS. INCOME (t-1) SQ. ABS. INC. (t-1)
Goals Yes No Yes -0.417*** -8.47 0.086* 1.73 -0.017*** -7.68 143.53***
Assists Yes No Yes -0.443*** -7.80 0.061 1.07 -0.013*** -5.06 110.10***
Shots Yes No Yes -6.334*** -12.23 0.685 1.31 -0.246*** -10.73 258.29***
Ball Contacts Yes No Yes -0.530*** -8.15 0.162** 2.40 -8.303*** -10.80 180.34***
Duels Yes No Yes -58.102*** -8.70 29.922*** 4.45 -3.400*** -11.49 230.53***
Duels Won Yes No Yes -108.492*** -3.78 114.480*** 3.91 -1.708*** -11.24 192.19***
REFERENCE GROUP: TEAMMATES
Dep. Variable Model: Outlier Analysis REL. INCOME (t+1) ABS. INCOME (t+1) SQ. ABS. INC. (t+1)
Goals Yes Yes Yes -0.270*** -4.43 0.457*** 6.48 -0.017*** -7.75 42.87***
Assists Yes Yes Yes -0.151** -2.30 0.556*** 7.31 -0.013*** -5.16 158.60***
Shots Yes Yes Yes -3.638*** -6.62 5.105*** 8.02 -0.263*** -11.45 360.35***
Ball Contacts Yes Yes Yes -62.963*** -3.19 229.632*** 10.19 -81.414*** -3.12 363.03***
Duels Yes Yes Yes -32.133*** -5.10 73.929*** 10.12 -3.508*** -11.85 392.97***
Duels Won Yes Yes Yes -14.037*** -4.27 38.849*** 10.21 -1.758*** -11.55 357.64***
Dep. Variable Model: Outlier Analysis REL. INCOME (t-1) ABS. INCOME (t-1) SQ. ABS. INC. (t-1)
Goals Yes Yes Yes -0.193*** -3.42 0.315*** 5.04 -0.017*** -7.75 142.37***
Assists Yes Yes Yes -0.167** -2.55 0.346*** 4.77 -0.013*** -5.16 106.89***
Shots Yes Yes Yes -4.272*** -7.2 3.040*** 4.62 -0.263*** -11.45 278.30***
Ball Contacts Yes Yes Yes -81.414*** -3.12 142.602*** 5.09 -81.414*** -3.12 195.27***
Duels Yes Yes Yes -46.818*** -6.12 43.462*** 5.12 -3.508*** -11.85 251.05***
Duels Won Yes Yes Yes -22.777*** -5.79 22.521*** 5.16 -1.758*** -11.55 238.06***
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1     Abowd (1990), Jensen and Murphy (1990), and Gibbons and Murphy (1990) investigate
the relationship between pay and managerial performance or corporate returns, or Asch
(1990) for Navy recruiters’ reactions to different incentive plans.
2 See also, for example, Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983), Green and Stokey (1983), O’Keefe,
Viscusi and Zeckhauser (1984), Rosen (1988), McLaughlin (1988), Rees (1992),
Prendergast (1999).
3 There are also some studies that test the theory of tournaments outside the context of sport
(see, e.g., Knoeber and Thurman 1994, Eriksson 1999, Rees 1992).
4   It was not possible to consider the year 1997 because no proxy for players’ salaries is
available.
5   It is possible to investigate further reference groups. Perhaps players compare themselves
to the best-paid player on the team or one can argue that players compare themselves with
other players that have the same position within the game. On the other hand, one can
argue that a superstar might be the best reference group. Workers may acknowledge the
distinction to a superstar and are therefore content with variations in pay that match
variations in ability.
6 We also used the ratio, instead of the differences, and the results remain robust.
7    Summary statistics are provided in Table A2 in the Appendix.
8 Information from the Kicker Sportmagazin has been used for empirical research studies in
the past (see for instance Eschweiler and Vieth (2004), Huebl and Swieter (2002),
Lehmann and Weigand (1998, 1999) and Lehmann and Schulze (2005)).
9 The publicly available data from Transfermarkt.de was only available for the season
2003/2004. Historical data was not available, as the Internet site just started to collect this
information in 2005. Furthermore, Transfermarkt.de covers only a limited number of
players in the German Bundesliga.
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10 Experts’ estimations of players’ salaries after the previous season. As mentioned
previously, we check the robustness of the results using the ratio instead of the difference
to measure the relative income position.
11 Considering estimations without controlling for the games or minutes played are insofar
justifiable, as playing in a game is already a signaling of performance (good performance
in the past and the training).
12  For a general discussion see Knack (1999).
